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Devolution of the Small Cities CDBG 
Program in Mississippi 
Dale Krane 
North Texas State University 
In 1982 respofiSibility for HUD's Smail Cities Community Development Block Grant pro-
gram was transfe"ed to srate governments as part of President Reagan's New Federalism in-
itiatives. Devolution was designed to (I) implement a new vision of American federalism, {2) 
shift control over a signi}ICOnt source of ]uumcitll resoiiJ'CeS for nonmerropolium areas, and 
(3) end the bypa1Sing of state government offu:ials in community development d«isionmak-
ing. This artick usts the eleven )'t1Qr (1975-198.5) history ofSnuz/1 Cities CDBG awatds in Mississip-
pi to assess the C01ISI!t[lll!llces of the prognun 's devolulion. Chlznges in the pattern of SUite CDBG 
awords indiazte that the program's devolution prodvad a policy rtdint:tion that channeled CDBG 
funds to a larger number of the smallest municipalities and pemrined mon loctJI discretion in 
project design. As a resu/1, HUD no lonter dictated community development policy to smaa 
cities. Instead, community development priorities in Mississippi emerged out of an award pro-
cess that involved interaction among srare and local offu:ill/s. 
In 1982 state governments were given the opportunity to assume respon-
sibility for the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) 
Small Cities Community Development Block Grant program (CDBG). As 
authorized by the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, state officials, 
not federal personnel, were permitted to devise their own procedures for 
awarding federal dollars to community development projects in their respec-
tive states. This intergovernmental transfer of program control was part of 
President Reagan's plan to create a new set of federal-state relationships.• 
Of the nine block grants created or revised by the 1981 Budget Act,2 only 
the Small Cities CDBG program had been a solely national-to-local grant. 
That is, for CDBG's frrst seven years (1975-1981), state governments were 
bypassed in the award process. State governments already bad considerable 
experience and influence, however, with the other eight block grants. Because 
of this radical departure from past practice, the Small Cities program has 
been labeled as "the truest test of state administrative innovation and chang-
ing governmental relations under the block grant component of the Reagan 
'New Federalism'. "3 
AUTHOR'S NOTE: I wish to acknowledge the advice and comments of Edward T . Jennings, 
Jr. and Alvin D. Sokolow in the preparation of this maouscript. 
1Deil S. Wright, "New Fedc:ralism: Recent Varieties of an Older Species," Ameriazn Revw 
of Public Administration 16 (Spring 1982): 56-74. 
2The nine block grants were in the areas of health (4), social servioes (3), education (1), and 
community development (1). 
3 Jerry Fensterman, Susan Szaniszlo, and Carl Stenberg, "Coping with Cutbacks: States, 
Localities 'Made Do' in 1982," Intergovernmental Perspective 819 (Winter 1983): 33. 
Reagan's vision of intergovernmental relations presumed that "devolu-
tion of responsibilities to governments closer to the people" would yield policy 
choices that differed from those made by national government agencies in 
charge of grants-in-aid. 4 The debate over the devolution of the Small Cities 
program revolved around several questions about state governments and their 
role in program implementation and the impact of a devolved program on 
eligible jurisdictions. For example, did the states possess sufficient managerial 
capacity to operate the Small Cities program effectively? Would state ad-
ministration be responsive to local priorities, and would program procedures 
be suited to the capabilities of small cities? Would devolution maintain na-
tional policy objectives and standards, especially the federal government's 
commitment to the low- and moderate-income (LMI) beneficiaries targeted 
by the HUD award process? Would program outcomes differ from what they 
bad been under HUD management? 
SMALL CITIES AND FEDERAL COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 
The Small Cities program is the non-entitlement portion of the larger Com-
munity Development Block Grant established in Title I of the 1974 Housing 
and Community Development Act (HCDA).5 From its beginnings in the 
Housing Act of 1949, the scope of the national government's commitment 
to community development was expanded significantly, frrst, by the 1954 
Urban Renewal program and, second, by the 1966 Model Cities program.6 
Presidents Nixon and Ford, in their opposition to what they regarded as a 
centralizing trend,1 supponed passage of the 1974 HCDA, which con-
solidated seven categorical grants operated by HUD into a single communi-
4George E. Peterson, "Federalism and the States: AD Experiment in Decentralization," The 
Reagan Record: An~~ of Amerioz~ Changing Domestic Priorilies, eds. John L. Palmer 
and lsabel Y. Sawhill (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1984), pp. 217-259. 
5U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Programs of HUD. HUD-214-10-PA 
(Washington, D.C.: May 1985), pp. 8-9. 
6-J"o review the evolution of national community development policy, see the foUowing: 
Walter Williams, Govun~Mnt by Agency: Lessons from the Social Program Grants-in-Aid Ex· 
perience (New York: Academic Press, 1980) and Bernard J. Frieden and Marshall Kaplan. The 
Politics of Neglect: Urban Aid from Model Cities to Revenue Slwring (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1975). 
1Three administrative procedures attempted between 1968 and 1972 with the aim of reform-
ing the Model Cities and other community development programs were (I) Neighborhood 
Development Programs (NDPs), (2) Annual Arrangement (AA) provisions, and (3) Pla.aned 
Variations (PYs). The three reforms shared the common goals of a reduction of federal intru· 
sion into local projectS and an expansion of local officials ' discretion in project design. However. 
these administrative proc:edures failed to eliminate the increasing number of complaints by local 
government officiak that cx=ive ca1eg0rization and proliferation of federal community develop-
ment programs produced both confusion among the varying requirements of the different grants-
in-aid and unnecessary national intrusion into local affairs. Their importance derives from their 
role as precursors to CDBG and their failure to create a sufficient " no-strings" environment 
for HUD programs. See Williams, Governii'U!Tit by Agency, pp. 39-40, for a more detailed discus-
sion of these reforms. 
ty development program. 8 The Nixon-Ford decentralist strategy assumed 
that this amalgamation of separate community development categorical grants 
into a "block" of money would give local authorities a greater degree of 
discretion and selection among eligible activities and projects than did the 
previous hodgepodge of categorical grants. This assumption was conflnlled 
as CDBG grew to be the largest and most popular of the original New 
Federalism block grants.9 
Congress mandated seven national objectives for the new block grant. The 
"most important (and controversial)" objective was the requirement that 
CDBG monies be spent to assist primarily "persons of low and moderate 
income. " 10 HUD operationalized these multiple goals into a "needs" for-
mula that was used to compute the annual entitlements made to cities of at 
least 50,000 population and to urban counties. 11 
Small cities and rural areas bad not been the main targets of federal com-
munity development policy during its twenty-five year evolution (1949-1974) 
prior to HCDA's passage. 12 Nor were smaller jurisdictions the intended 
targets of the 1974 CDBG program. They were included in HCDA by the 
congressional subcommittees on housing in order to bolster support for the 
block grant program.13 Congress set aside approximately 20 percent of the 
available CDBG funds fci'r a "discretionary" pool of money (see PL 95-128, 
Sec. 106) to provide grants awarded by HUDon a competitive basis to the 
nation's smaller governments (i.e., with populations under 50,000). More 
than 33,000 small general-purpose governments eligible for CDBG funding 
thus were required to vie with one another for the "discretionary" awards.14 
By forcing smaller jurisdictions into a nationwide competition for CDBG 
money, Congress denied smaller cities and rural areas the annual entitlements 
made available to larger communities and also placed the smaller cities in 
8The seven categorical grants folded into the 1974 CDBG program were (1) Urban Renewal. 
(2) Model Cities, (3) Sec. 702 Water and Sewer, (4) Sec. 703 Neighborbood Facilities. (S) Title 
II Public: Facilities, (6) Title IV Open Spaces Land, and (7) Sec:. 312 Housing Rebabilitation. 
(U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Community ~p~nt: TM 
Workings of a Federai·Loaz/ Block Grant A-57 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print· 
ing Office, March 1977), pp. 12-14.) 
9Parris N. Glendening and Mavis Mann Reeves, Pragm~~tic F«Jerrzlism (2nd ed.; PacifiC 
Palisades, Cal.: Palisades Publishen, 1984), p. 244. 
10Mic:hael Reagan and John Sanzone, The New F#!dera/jsm (2nd ed.; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1981), p. 141. For a complete text of CDBG's national objectives, see Richard 
P. Nathan et al., Block GrlllllS For Co,unity /)eyftopmmt (WashingtOn, D.C.: U.S. Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development, January 1977), p. 53. 
11HUD's fonnula included three elements: population. housing overcrowding. and the ex· 
tent of poverty (which was given double weight in the formula). The 1m HCDA Amendments 
substituted age of housing stoclc (i.e., percentage built prior to 1940) for housing overcrowding. 
U.S. ACIR. Co,unity ~dopment. p. 18. Also see Paul R. Dommel. "Soc:ial Targeting 
in Community Development," Politiazl Science Quarterly 9S (Fall 1980): 465-478. 
12(ieorge Hale and Marian Lief Palley, The Politics of Federal Grants (WashingtOn, D.C.: 
Congressional Quanerly Press, 1981), p. 148. 
13A detailed legislative history of the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act c:an 
be found in U.S. ACIR, Community ~elopment, pp. 3-33. 
14Nathan et al. , Block Grants for Co, unity Devdopment, p. 84. 
the position of adapting local community development goals to the award 
criteria established by HUD. 
Although only 959 nonmetropolitan jurisdictions applied for the discre-
tionary money in the first year, Jj the number of applications rapidly in-
creased in subsequent years. HUD developed a Project Selection System {PSS) 
to sort out the increasing number of applications. 16 Success for a given small 
city did not come easy, as evidenced by the 37.2 percent success rate (357 
awards out of 959 applications) in FY 1975.17 HUD used its authority over 
the discretionary funds for small cities to push localities in the direction of 
housing rehabilitation. 18 Small cities that applied for CDBG dollars quick-
ly discovered that they would be successful only if they listed housing 
rehabilitation as their top priority .19 
HUD's treatment of small cities and rural areas led to a series of well found-
ed complaints. For example, two separate studies of HUD's administration 
of the Small Cities CDBG program confirmed the allegation that awards 
within the nonmetropolitan category usually went to the relatively larger 
jurisdictions, while the smallest cities (e.g., under 5,000 population), where 
"need" often was most acute, lost out in the national competition for pro-
ject funds. 20 Not only did these fmdings demonstrate that the smallest 
jurisdictions were at a disadvantage in the "grant game," but the results also 
confirmed the contention that HUD concentrated Small Cities projects in 
the relatively larger small cities that were more likely to possess the manage-
ment capacity to operate the comprehensive slum removal projects pre-
ferred by HUo.z• 
Out of these complaints emerged a Carter administration project that later 
was adopted as part of Reagan's New Federalism proposals. Through the 
late 1970s the Council of State Community Affairs Agencies (COSCAA) lob-
bied HUD to test the feasibility of state government management of CDBG's 
ISSmall cities which had ongoing urban renewal projects received CDBG funds under 
HCDA's "hold harmless" provision. The 1977 Amendments to the act terminated this provi-
sion. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Community Development Block 
Grant Program: First Annual Report (Washington, D.C. : December 1975), p. 62. 
1~e Project Selection System combined three components: (1) the degree to which the pro· 
posed project directly met the criteria established by HCDA, (2) the degree to which LMl per· 
sons were to be benefited, and (3) the consistency of the proposed project with local and state-
wide plans. See B. J . Reed and Roy Green, "Getting From Nation to States." From Narion 
To States: The SfTUl/1 Cities Community Development Block Grant Program, eds. Edward T. 
Jennings, Jr ., Dale Krane, Alex Pattaltos. and B. J. Reed (Albany: State University of New 
York Press. 1986), pp. 23-43. 
17U.S. ACIR, Community Development, p. 46. 
IBWalter Williams argues that "HUD was determined to integrate its community develop-
ment and housing programs into one grant." See Williams, Govemmenr by Agency. p. 105. 
19tbid. 
lawilliam Giles, Gerald Gabris. and Dale Krane, "Dynamics in Rural Policy Development: 
The Uniqueness of County Government," Public Administration Review 40 (January/February 
1 980): 24-28 and Urban Services Research and Engineering, An Evaluation of the Small Ciries 
Program (Washington. D.C.: HUD Internal Report. September 1981). 
21 Hale and Palley, The Politics of Federal Grants, pp. 147-154. 
Small Cities component.22 COSCAA, along with the National Governors' 
Association (NGA), argued that the states were no longer the antiquated and 
unresponsive governmentS that had forced municipalities to seek direct federal 
assistance. HUD selected Kentucky and Wisconsin for a 1980 "demonstra-
tion project" to test the idea of state government administration of the Small 
Cities program. 23 A HUD-sponsored evaluation of the experiment found 
that officials in 58 percent of Kentucky localities and in 70 percent of Wiscon-
sin localities preferred state management over HUD management. 24 The 
Reagan administration immediately touted the demonstration project as 
evidence that states could take over many federal assistance programs.25 
The transfer of the Small Cities program to state management fit neatly 
into Reagan's New Federalism initiatives and was included in the 1981 Budget 
Act. State administration of the Small Cities program drew sharp but futile 
opposition from interest groups that sought to continue the direct linkage 
between Washington, D.C. and the local jurisdictions. The National League 
of Cities (NLC) worried about the states' management capacity and about 
a possible rebirth of traditional state-municipality rivalry over local develop-
ment programs. Citizens groups, such as Rural America, believed that the 
transfer proposal would diminish the social targeting of CDBG funds to LMI 
beneficiaries. u 
The 1981 act raised the percentage of CDBG funds set aside for eligible 
nonmetropolitan cities and counties from 20 percent to 30 percent. Com-
pared to the $926 million for FY 1981, $1.019 billion (one of the few 
nondefense increases in the 1981 act) was appropriated for Small Cities CDBG 
in FY 1982.27 The act also specified that states electing to administer the 
program must "buy-in" by making a 10 percent cash or in-kind match and 
must prepare statements of community development objectives and fund 
uses.28 Thirty-six states and Puerto Rico "bought-in" to state administra-
tion in FY 1982, and in FY 1983 ten more states assumed control of the Small 
Cities program. 29 
22Arnold M. Howitt, Managing Federalism: Studil!s in Intergovernmental Rehztions 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984), pp. 71-76. 
23Reed and Green. "Getting From Nation to States." 
24U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Interim Report: Two Stau CDBG 
Small Cities Demonstrations (Washington, D.C.: May 1981), memo; Second Interim Reporr: 
Wisconsin State Demonstration (WashiDgton, D.C.: July 1981), memo. 
25Reed and Green, "Getting From Nation to Swes." 
26B. J. Reed and Roy Green, ' 'Serendipity: 1981 Budget Reconciliation Act and the Small 
Cities Community Development Block Grant Program" (Paper presented at the annual meeting 
of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, 28-30 October 1982). 
27U.S. General Accounting Office, States Ar~ Making Good Prognss In Implementing The 
Small Cities Community Development Block Grant Program (Washington, D.C.: 
GAO/RCED-83-186, 8 September 1983), p. 4. 
28U.S. ACIR, Intergovernmental Perspective 819 (Winter 1983): 33. 
29four states (Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland, and New York) have decided to continue with 
HUD administration of the Small Cities CDBG program. GAO, Slates Are Making Good Pro-
gress, p. 3. 
A "BEFORE AND AFTER" TEST OF AN 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PROGRAM 
This article assesses some of the consequences of state assumption of the 
administrative responsibilities for the Small Cities block grants in the State 
of Mississippi. In particular, the research analyzes changes in the pattern of 
CDBG awards in terms of number, size, projects funded, recipients served, 
and national versus state objectives achieved. The eleven year (1975-1985) 
history of Small Cities CDBG awards in Mississippi serves as a strong test 
of programmatic changes due to devolution because this state (1) contains 
the largest proportion of targeted LMI citizens in the nation, (2) has the coun-
try's third largest proportion of targeted communities (i.e., under 50,000 
population), and (3) only recently has adopted some administrative reforms 
(e.g. , a merit system, executive preparation of budgets, and program evalua-
tions) common in other states. Mississippi's experience with state control of 
the Small Cities CDBG program will be examined through a description of 
the state's award process and by a comparison of award patterns under state 
administration (1982-1985) with those made by HUD (1975-1981). 
A systematic test of the changes resulting from the transfer of the Small 
Cities program to state control would require a comparison of the pattern 
of awards made by state agencies with the panern under earlier HUD ad-
ministration. The data for the before and after analysis presented here comes 
from the eleven year history (1975-1985) of the Small Cities CDBG program 
in the State of Mississippi. If the primary objective of aid to small cities is 
community development activity designed to benefit principally low- and 
moderate-income individuals, then Mississippi is an advantageous site in 
wbich to examine the effects of state control of CDBG awards on the target 
jurisdictions. Measured by any yardstick, Mississippi is extremely poor and 
rural. Among all states, it ranks fiftieth in per capita income. Approximate-
ly 35 percent of the state's residents live on federal assistance payments, and 
in thirty-two of the state's eighty-two counties, the principal source of in-
come is federal transfer payments. These income levels are reflected in low 
levels of community development. For example, while 84.4 percent of all 
housing units in Mississippi were built after 1939 (tenth best nationally), 27 
percent of all dwellings in the state are substandard (fifth worst nationally). 
As of 1981, sixty-six municipalities, or 23 percent of the state's incorporated 
areas, still did not have sewer and water systems. 
Although Mississippi has changed from a strictly agricultural economy to 
one that includes significant manufacturing and service sectors, the state re-
mains very rural with a widely dispersed population. Compared to the na-
tional average of 73.7 percent urban population, Mississippi's urban popula-
tion is 47.3 percent (only Vermont and West Virginia are more rural). Eighty-
three percent of all county seats, usually the largest municipality in a coun-
ty, have a population of less than 5,000. Only three Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas exist wholly within the state and only one city, the state 
capital of Jackson, has a population over 50,000. Thus, the state's dead last 
or almost last ranking on a wide range of community development indicators 
explains why many observers consider Mississippi to be the least developed 
of the fifty states. 30 
THE NEW FEDERALISM PA TIERN OF SMALL 
CITIFS CDBG AWARDS IN MISSISSIPPI 
The crucial component of state takeover is each state's award mechanism. 
States were allowed to copy HUD's award criteria or to design their own, 
provided the state system complied with congressional intent and HUD regula-
tions. HUD's 1982 regulations (24 CFR Part 570.489) gave "maximum feasi-
ble deference to State interpretation of the statutory requirements." This 
policy gave the states a free hand to design their own award procedures. The 
freedom of program design was so great that states could even devise their 
own defmition of low- and moderate-income households. 
Given wide latitude in program design, the states which chose to operate 
the Small Cities program in FY 1982 produced three basic award mechanisms 
whose permutations validate the old slogan that the states are the laboratories 
of democracy. The three types of state award procedures were (1) statewide 
competition, (2} formula allocation, and (3) substate/regional competition.31 
Thirty-two of the thirty-six states participating in state.administration in 1982 
opted for some form of statewide competition, one state (Ohio) relied total-
ly on formula funding, two states (Arizona and Utah) used substate com-
petition, and one state and a territory (Oklahoma and Puerto Rico) developed 
hybrid systems.32 
The Mississippi Decision Process 
Mississippi utilized a "general competition" system to award CDBG money 
for FY 1982. A staff member of the Department of Community Develop-
ment, Governor's Office of Federal-State Programs, described the process 
in this fashion: 
»fra Shark:anslc:y, TM United States: A Study of a Developing Country (New York: David 
McKay, 1975), pp. 62-65. 
31 A fuller description of each major type of swe award system is provided in KeDIICdl Bleakly 
et al., The State Community Developmell Block Grtllft Program: The Fim Ytw's ~
(Washington. D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban DeveJopmeDt. May 1983), pp. 
62-63. 
32The competitive award systems exhibit the design freedom and the individual imagination 
and policy objectives of the various states. Five basic types of competitive mechanisms bave 
emerged among the states: (1) general competition, (2) competition by project type. (3) 
single/multipurpose grant competition, (4) population-based competition, and (S) hybrid com-
petition. Project competition is most typical (used by 47.4 percent of the swes), with general 
competition being second in popularity (26.2 percent). Hybrid competition (13.3 percent), 
single/multipurpose competition (7 .8 percent), and population-based competition (5.3 pen:ent) 
are used by the remaining states. For more detail, see ibid. 
Mississippi decided to let the applications drive the award system ... funds 
were not set aside [initially) for each of the program areas (i.e., economic 
development, housing, and public works) targeted by the Governor's CDBG 
Taslc Force prior to receipt of apptications .. . the needs expressed in each of 
the three target areas determined the amount of state funds set aside for each 
area. 33 
To select grant rectpients from applicants, the Governor's Office staff 
developed a rating system that assigned points (maximum of 1 ,000) to each 
application. Half of the points were gained from the general rating factors 
for all projects (i.e., management capacity factors) and half of the points 
were based on the project's quality. Each jurisdiction's application was rated 
by several staff members of the Depanment of Community Development, 
and the data submitted as part of the application were verified through on-
site visits by staff from the depanmeru . .JA The director of the Governor's 
Office best summarized the Mississippi award mechanism when she said: 
"Federal decisions were typically a go/ no go decision. Ours is a more com-
plex scoring system, so that no one factor will win or lose an award ."'J, 
One of tbe complaints local officials (in Mississippi and elsewhere) had 
about HUD administration was the constant change in HUD rules. This same 
concern was raised about state administration during public hearings in 
Mississippi. Although the Governor's Office claimed a commitment to re-
taining tbe basic application and competition procedures for several years. 
important changes occurred in the first four years, partly as a result of a 
change in governors. For example, the FY 1982 threshold for LMI, which 
was the old HUD figure of 80 percent, was altered to 51 percent. This change 
was executed "with guidance from HUD."36 Second, Mississippi's award 
criteria for FY 1984 were changed from a general competition to a competitive 
award system based on four types of projects and three different decision 
cycles: (1) housing and public works awarded on an annual basis, (2) economic 
development awarded on a monthly basis, and (3) "special opportunities" 
awarded on an "urgent need" (i.e., emergency) basis.37 
The Pattern of CDBG A wards in Mississippi 
The decision process used by Mississippi during its frrst four years 
(1982-1985) of control over Small Cities CDBG funds produced an award 
33lnterview with ~f. Governor's OffiCe of Feden.I-Swe Programs, State of Mississippi. 
1983. 
lAFor more deuils about Mississippi's proc:edwes for CDBG awards, see Dale Krane. "State 
Government Control of Small Cities' CDBG Awards: Tbe Case of Mississippi.' ' Admimsttr-
ing T1u! N~w F~lism, eds. Lewis G. Bender and James A. Stner (Boulder, Col.: Westview 
Press, 1986), pp. 248-271. 
35lnterview with staff, Governor's Office of Federal-State Programs, State of Mississippi. 
1983. 
16M.ississippi, Community /Xveiopment Block Glllllt 1984 Final Stattmtnt (Jaclcson, Miss.: 
Governor's Office of Federai..State Programs, IS May 1984). p. 59. 
HJoterview with s taff. Governor's Ofrlce of Federal-State Programs, State of Mi.ssissippi. 
1984. 
pattern substantially different from the earlier practices under HUD ad-
ministration (1975-1981). Table 1 shows that HUD awarded an annual 
average of 41 Small Cities grants to Mississippi, a state with 289 eligible small 
cities and 78 eligible counties. The CDBG awards funded by HUD averaged 
almost a half million dollars per award and went primarily to comprehen-
sive housing rehabilitation projects (HUD's operational defmition of com-
munity development). 
This preference for fairly large-scale grants to a relatively small number 
of jurisdictions was the typical award pattern nationwide during HUD's seven 
years of responsibility for the Small Cities program. Serious management 
problems sometimes were the result. Small cities with part-time elected of-
ficials and few if any trained public managers struggled to handle the large 
(for them) projects and budgets (sometimes exceeding annual city operating 
budgets by three or four times). Consequently, HUD area office personnel 
tended to avoid allocating grants to smaller communities (usually under 5,000 
population) that could not easily manage typical renewal projects or afford 
full-time grantsmen. 38 
TABLE I 
Coauauaity Dnelopmeat Block Grut Awards ia Mississippi. 197S-1985 
Year Totlll awarded Number of awards Average award 
HUD ad.ministration 
1975 s 9,758,968 33 $295,726 
1976 12,670,075 33 383,942 
1977 15,744,078 43 366,141 
1978 20,310,078 38 534,476 
1979 26,104,000 49 532,735 
1980 30,875,000 47 656,915 
1981 30,183,000 43 720,875 
1975-1981 average 41 498,687 
State administration 
1982 33.204,641 97 342,316 
1983 29,031,749 101 287,443 
1984 30.218.520 114 26S.01S 
1985* 28,400,517 84 338,101 
1982-1985 average 99 308,234 
SOURCE: Governor's Office of Federal-State Programs, State of Mississippi. 
a0oes not include 6.7 percent of FY 198S funds unencumbered as of 14 February 
1986. 
38Gary A. Mattson and PaulL. Solano, "New Federalism And Small Towns: Do Planning-
Management Skills Matter For Access Funding And Benefus?" JoUTNll of Architect!Vf! and 
Planning Research 3 (March 1986): 133-147. 
State administration of the program in Mississippi in 1982-1985, as il-
lustrated in Table l, produced an annual average of 99 Small Cities awards. 
more than twice the annual average of 41 Small Cities awards in the previous 
seven years. (About 77 percent of CDBG Small Cities grants in Mississippi 
have gone to incorporated places since the start of the program in 197 5. while 
nonmetropolitan counties have received the remaining 23 percent.) Under 
state administration. the dollar amounts of the awards averaged $308,000 
apiece, a 37 percent drop from the $498,000 average awarded by HUD. These 
shifts in the Mississippi award panern resemble similar shifts in other 
states.39 
TABLE 2 
Dtstribudoa of Small Odes CDBG Awards a Milliaippi. 1911-1985" By Siu of Muaic:ipaJity 
1980 popa.ladoa of iacofporated places 
1-- ~ ~ 10000- 25000-0-99, 2499 .., 9999 l4999 49999 
Number of 48.90ft 21.80ft 12.50ft • 8.0f{o 6.2% 2.8% 
incorporated 
places 
N = 289 141 63 36 23 18 8 
HUD administration 
1981 awards 17 .S'lo !S.O'l• 22.5'lo 25.0"1o 15.0'lo S.O'lt 
N = 40 7 6 9 10 6 2 
State administration 
1982 awards 21.4'1t 23.2'1o 26.8'lo 12.5'lo 10.7"lo 5.4Cifo 
N =56 12 13 15 7 6 3 
1983 awards 35.1 lil'o 20.3'lo 20.3'lo 13.51il'o 6.80fo 4.0Cifo 
N = 74 26 IS IS 10 s 3 
1984 awards 39.1 "• 21.801. ll.S'i't 9.2.,. 10.4'lt 8.0Cifo 
N=87 34 19 10 8 9 7 
198S awardsb 39.7'lo 24.1'1e 13.80fo 6.9'lo 10.3'lo 5.2"1o 
N =58 23 14 8 4 6 3 
SOURCE: Governor's Office of Federal-State Programs, State of Mississippi. 
&Excludes awards made to counties. 
bDoes not include awards in the last month of FY 1985. 
One of the strongest criticisms voiced by local officials under HUD's opera-
tion of the Small Cities program concerned the relative inability of smaller 
cities to obtain CDBG awards.00 Table 2 shows that, although "larger" 
39GAO, States An1 Malcing Good Progi'ESS and Bleakly et al. , The State Community Dellelop-
ment Block Grant Program. 
~ale and Palley, The Politics of Federal Grants, p. 148. 
small cities (i.e., more than 5,000 residents) constituted only 17 percent of 
all Mississippi municipalities, HUD placed almost half (45 percent) of its FY 
1981 Small Cities grants in these localities. Mississippi officials after 1981 
reversed this concentration of awards by increasing the proportion of grants 
to cities under 2,500 population. While HUD in FY 1981 awarded only 13 
of 40 (32.5 percent) grants to cities under 2,500, state administrators increased 
this number to 37 of 58 grants (63.8 percent) by FY 1985. A corresponding 
change in the distribution of CDBG awards made to Mississippi counties was 
also achieved by state officials.4 ' 
Clearly. smaller Mississippi cities became more successful under state ad-
ministration in applying for and receiving CDBG grants. Proportionately 
fewer such governments were denied funding after 1981,42 a pattern that 
corresponded to national trends.43 Larger small cities were not necessarily 
losers in this trend. As Table 2 notes, the number of CDBG grants given 
to cities with populations of more than 5,000 remained about the same after 
the last year of HUD administration. Rather, the increase in awards to the 
smallest plac.es was accomplished by reducing the sizes of individual grants 
and spreading out community development funds to more jurisdictions in 
total. 
The proposal to devolve authority over Small Cities funds to state officials 
had provoked fears that national community development objectives would 
be compromised or even ignored. Although the 1974 HCDA permitted thir-
teen different categories of eligible projects, HUD, during its period of con-
trol, converted the Small Cities Block Grants into a new version of the depart-
ment's previous urban renewal program with an emphasis on housing 
rehabilitation. Evidence from different studies demonstrates that many states 
increased the number of awards made for public works and economic 
development projects and, at the same time, decreased the number of awards 
made in support of housing rehabilitation ... Mississippi was no exception. 
Just over 60 percent of the CDBG awards made by Mississippi officials in 
1982-1985 were for public works; only 4.9 percent supported housing pro-
jects. Economic development projects accounted for 15 percent of the state's 
awards and almost 13 percent of the awards supponed emergency (urgent 
needs) relief projects.•s 
Opponents of state administration of the Small Oties program argued that 
41For more detail, see Dale Krane, "The Mississippi Experience," From Nation To SUites, 
eds. Jennings et al., pp. 99-126. 
42Ibid. 
4 3-fhe 1983 HUD study of state award paaerns observes tlw smaller cities bave improved 
chances of "winning" CDBG funds; but the 1983 HUD study also notes that since there are 
so many very small communities. their "sua:ess" rates still remain below tha1 of the larger c:lilible 
jurisdictions. Bleakly et al .• TM State Community !Xve/opmmt Block Grant Program, pp. 
111-116. 
"Edward T. Jennings, Jr .• Dale Krane. Alex N. Panakos. and B. J. Reed, "Assessing the 
State Small Cities CDBG Experience," From Nation To Slates, cds. Jennings ct al., pp. 221-2SL 
45For an analysis of the project types awarded CDBG funds by Mississippi, see Dale Krane, 
"'The Mississippi Experience," From Nation To States, eds. Jennings et al., pp. 99-126. 
state government would award CDBG funds in a manner divergent from na-
tional policy objectives. Table 3, a proftle of CDBG beneficiaries in Mississip-
pi, permits a comparison of national policy objectives with Mississippi's pat-
tern of Small Cities awards . 
TABLEJ 
CDBG Beaef'lciaries ia Mississippi, 1912-1985 
1932 1983 1934 1985" 
Low- and moderate-income 105,758 113,192 31 7.675 147.738 
persons 
Percent of CDBG funds 84 78 jj 94 
benefiting low- and 
moderate-income persons 
Permanent jobs created 3,575 !,828 4,766 3,592 
Amount of funds s 27.8 s 34.0 s 79.0 $104.8 
leveraged (millions) 
SOURCE: CommiUiity DevdopTMnr Block Grant Program /984 & 1985 Final 
Statements (Governor's Office of Federal-Stare Programs, Stare of Mississippi). 
a Does not include 6. 7 percent of FY 1985 funds unencumbered as of 14 February 
1986. 
To what extent did the state benefit low- and moderate-income persons 
in its CDBG allocations during 1982-1985? Table 3 shows that high percen-
tages of funds in each of the four years went to such populations, based on 
the characteristics of recipient neighborhoods. The four-year average was 
83.3 percent, which exceeded HUD's "75-25" rule and was an exception to 
Paul Dommel's fmding ·that HUD's "level of social targeting . . . reached 
a plateau with most jurisdictions tending to cluster around an average of 
60 to 65 percent. " 46 The Mississippi experience also compares favorably 
with the results from the 1983 GAO study of the Small Cities program that 
contrasted the last year of HUD administration (1981) with the first year 
of state operation (1982) in seven states. Benefits to LMI persons in the seven 
states averaged 88.2 percent in 1981 and 77 .1 percent in 1982." Percentages 
of CDBG funds benefiting LMI persons in Mississippi remained at or near 
the national level after state takeover, even though state officials redirected 
Small Cities awards away from housing rehabilitation and toward economic 
development and public works projects. Equally imponant from a 
developmental perspective was the state government's insistence that jurisdic-
tions applying for CDBG money agree to commit other funds (public and/or 
private) in suppon of proposed projects, thus augmenting the funds available 
for community development.48 
46t>ommel, " Social Targeting," 476. 
47GAO. States Are Making Good Progress. p. 16. 
48John Sidor, "Communication," Public Administration Review 45 (May/June 1985): 
44S-449. 
Another approach by which to determine the extent of state divergence 
from national policy objectives is to measure the degree of change in the 
types of jurisdictions that received awards from HUD compared to the types 
of jurisdictions that received awards from the state. Table 4 explores the 
"needs" related characteristics of Mississippi cities that were awarded CDBG 
funds between 1975-1985. Two significant changes are evident. First, the 
average population size of grant recipients decreased after state takeover by 
26.4 percent , a direct consequence of the Mississippi decision to expand the 
number of awards given. Second, the average percentage of black popula-
tion in recipient cities dropped after 1981. Because the state decided to 
distribute CDBG grants to a larger number of cities under state administra-
tion (an annual average of 99 as compared to only 41 under HUD administra-
tion), it was no longer possible to concentrate Small Cities funds in 
municipalities (77 out of 289) with majority black populations. 
TABLE 4 
Clwxterisdcs of CDBG Recipient Jarisdictions in Mississippi. 1975-1985" 
Means 
Perceat Per- Perceat Percat 
Tow black capita ponrty pre.l9o40 
Yeu popalatioa popalatioa iac:ome poptllatio• lloaiaa 
HUD administration 
1915 2,215 51.8 $4,959 31.7 25.7 
1976 6,844 47.2 4,767 29.9 22.3 
1977 7,678 47.4 4,742 29.3 20.6 
1978 8,365 53.9 4,488 33.2 22.5 
1979 7,721 SO. I 4,690 30.3 21.1 
1980 10.267 42.1 5,046 26.2 21.7 
1981 6,460 45.3 4,858 29.7 22.8 




1982 4,838 42.3 4,841 28.8 23.3 
1983 5,078 38.1 5,183 27.2 22.3 
1984 6,462 41.3 4,811 28.8 23.0 
198Sb 4,491 38.5 4,740 28.8 23.4 
1982- 5.217 40.1 4,894 28.4 23.0 
1985 
average 
SOURCE: Governor's Office of Federal-State Programs, State of Mississippi. 
•Excludes counties. 
bDoes not include 6.7 percent of FY 1985 funds unencumbered as of 14 February 
1986. 
The change from HUD to state administration made very little difference 
in the other "needs" indicators-income, poveny percentage, and age of 
housing. This lack of change resulted less from the state's adherence to the 
HUD emphasis on targeting aid to needy communities than from the presence 
of widespread poverty throughout Mississippi. Almost any criteria of need 
the state could adopt would direct CDBG funds to impoverished localities 
containing significant numbers of LMI persons, black and/or white. 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEVOLUTION 
Devolution to state government control altered the nature of the Small Cities 
CDBG program in Mississippi. The evidence presented in the foregoing tables 
leaves little doubt about the program's transformation. The changes 
associated with state administration are substantial: 
• More grants were awarded annually under state administration, and the 
average dollar amount of each grant was smaller. 
• Three-fourths of the projects funded were for public works or economic 
development, while housing and concentrated neighborhood revitalization 
projects accounted for less than 10 percent of the state's awards. 
• More than three-fifths of the state's awards went to the smallest cities. with 
popuJations of 2,500 and under. 
• The probabilitY that a given small city would obtain a CDBG grant almost 
doubled. 
• The percentage of funds benefiting low- and moderate-income persons re-
mained essentially the same. 
These new features and outcomes resulting from state takeover meant that 
in Mississippi the Small Cities program experienced change in a complex 
fashion. On the one hand. state administration expanded the program to in-
clude more diversity in the types of projects eligible and fundable under the 
state's award criteria. At the same time, state administration narrowed the 
CDBG program at the community level by channeling the bulk of community 
development funds to single-purpose projects rather than to multipur-
pose/ neighborhood reconstruction projects. It is relevant to note that the 
programmatic changes due to devolution observed in Mississippi fit closely 
with the changes that have been reported in other States. •9 
Clearly, small cities and counties in Mississippi gained increased access 
to CDBG money with the move to state administration. Mississippi's award 
criteria ensured that more of the smallest localities would obtain Communi-
ty Development grants. Although the price paid for this greater " success" 
rate has been smaller (in dollar terms) annual awards, many of the smallest 
localities in Mississippi that did not receive funds from HUD received 
assistance from the state. With more very small cities being awarded CDBG 
'
9Jennings et aJ. , "Assessing the State Small Cities Experience," F'om Nation Tc States. 
eds. Jennings ct al .. pp. 221-251. 
funds, the previous advantage larger communities had over smaller ones was 
reduced. One imponant consequence of this inclusion of smaller cities in the 
ranks of COBG recipients was that a major obstacle to small town 
development-the absence of capital-could be more easily overcome for 
some communities.so 
Another set of policy consequences generated by state control can be 
thought of as a " return to the past." The state-managed CDBG program 
restored the linkage between state and local governments that the HUD-local 
relationship had weakened. While small cities in the past had charged that 
state governments ignored them, the shift from HUO to state administra-
tion not only funded more cities, but also offered them more choices and 
thus was more responsive to local needs. Because the Mississippi award system 
provided options as to types of projects eligible for funding, jurisdictions 
in this state were able to tailor their own strategies for community develop-
ment. State administration permitted the small cities to pursue traditional 
municipal priorities, such as public works projects, an option limited by the 
earlier HUO emphasis on housing construction and rehabilitation.s1 CDBG 
support for housing projects was still available under state administration, 
an indication of how small town officials in Mississippi were given freedom 
of choice in the design and execution of local community development after 
1981. 
Perhaps the broadest and most fundamental outcome of state administra-
tion as exemplified by the Mississippi case involves the definition of "com-
munity development." Through four decades of national policy debates, there 
has not yet emerged a consensus on the meaning of community development, 
especially in terms of the citizens to be served and the strategies to be util-
ized. Are the beneficiaries to be the inner city poor, the rural poor, families 
with moderate as well as low incomes, or all such groups? Even more disagree-
ment exists over the appropriate and effective strategies by which "community 
development" can be advanced. Should funds be expended on slum clearance, 
on income subsidies, on job creation, or on the improvement of essential 
communitywide services? Much of the conflict over the CDBG program arises 
out of the confusion over these policy choices. 52 Debate also continues, of 
course, over which level of government should make these policy choices. 
Devolution of the Small Cities program diminished the voice of HUD 
poiicymakers and enhanced the voice of state and local government officials 
in the defmition and strategies of community development. HUD was no 
longer able to dictate to localities project priorities for COBG funds. Instead, 
project types and communities benefited became a function of intrastate 
political and administrative considerations as well as national policy. In the 
case of Mississippi, state government officials devised an award system that 
accommodated the requests of small-city officials and allocated CDBG money 
50fiale and Palley, The Politics of Federal Grants, p. 146. 
51G!endening and Reeves, Pragmtllic Federalism, p. 200. 
52 Jennings et al., "Assessing the State Small Cities Experience," pp. 246-248. 
to a wider range of communities than under HUD administration. While state 
and local interests were being served, national policy in targeting CDBG funds 
to low- and moderate-income persons continued to be applied in Mississippi. 
